



New Zealand Fire Service National Headquarters

Operational Review Report

47 VICTORIA STREET
RANGIORA

Incident Date: 20/09/2009 9:17:42 PM

Document Information

Incident Type:	Structure Fire
Number:	F0512564
Report Completed By:	Owen Kinsella & Brian Davey
Reason for the Report:	Operational review

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Executive Summary

A house fire occurred at 47 Victoria St. Rangiora on 20 September 2009 resulting in the death of an elderly female occupant. The Fire Service is conducting a separate investigation into the cause and origin of the fire.

Early warning of the fire was provided by the activation of a smoke alarm. The occupants chose to try and extinguish the fire and this may have delayed them reporting it via the 111 system. The occupants were told to leave the house by the Communications Centre Operator who took the emergency call but they continued to attempt to extinguish the fire.

The male occupant was trapped within the locked conservatory and was rescued by a member of the public who broke through the grilled security door. The female occupant had returned to her bedroom and collapsed.

The Officer in Charge (OIC) of the first responding appliance was informed by a member of the public, who had rescued the male occupant that the missing female occupant was in the lounge area and, after an initial fire knock-down, a search commenced in that area. Valuable time was spent searching the smoke-logged lounge and nearby areas. Due to thick smoke down to floor level and heat, (which hampered effective use of the thermal imaging camera), the initial search and rescue team made two passes of the lounge and hallway before finding the door to the bedroom where the missing occupant was located.

At that time their breathing apparatus low air warning whistles were operating and the firefighters had begun to retreat. The search team member who located the missing woman found no signs of life and assumed her to be deceased. The two firefighters exited the building and reported finding the missing occupant. Another rescue team (Woodend) with fresh breathing apparatus was tasked to complete the rescue.

Chronology

The SMS Report message log was used to note the times that certain events were reported to the Communications Centre and recorded. Other events are as recalled by individuals or interpolations between these times.

The time from arrival of the first appliance to the time the patient was handed over to ambulance cannot be determined exactly and is estimated at being 27 to 30 minutes. The woman died in hospital the next day.

Conclusions

The fire started in an electric blanket and attempts by the occupants to extinguish it may have contributed to the spread of the fire.

Both occupants are likely to have survived had they left the house immediately as instructed during their emergency phone call.

The actions of the firefighters who found the woman were in line with their training not to put their own safety at risk while attempting a rescue. However interviews with firefighters suggested there may be a conflict between operational instructions relating to the need to preserve the scene of a death with the priority to remove a person found in a fire as soon as possible, unless death can be confirmed beyond doubt.

In general, the review found the fire brigade response had been well resourced, appropriate, and carried out by well-trained volunteers. However, there are some corrective actions that, when implemented, will lead to improved Fire Service operations.

At the scene, ambulance staff raised concerns with the Fire Incident Controller about the time it took to rescue the elderly woman. These concerns were taken into account during the review and subsequently addressed through a meeting of St John Ambulance and Fire Service representatives and in the corrective actions in this report.

Terms of Reference



Operations Review Terms of Reference

**Structure fire,
47 Victoria Street,
Rangiora
Date: 20/9/09**

Authority

The team is to review the incident at the request of the National Commander Mike Hall

Background

This incident was a house fire that resulted in a fatality at 47 Victoria Street Rangiora on 20 September 2009.

The Fire Service is conducting a separate investigation into the cause and origin of the fire.

Purpose

The purpose of this operations review is to provide an objective, documented analysis of this incident in order to:

- Improve operational effectiveness and efficiency
- Improve operational procedures, particularly in regard to safety and best practice
- Achieve compliance with the Fire Service Act 1975
- Provide a measure of operational performance
- Identify training needs

Incident details

Structure fire resulting in death of occupant.

Review Team

Name Investigation Team Leader: Owen Kinsella

Fire Region Manager/Commander,
Bay-Waikato Fire Region

Name Brian Davey
 National Manager Operational Standards

Terms of Reference

The appointed review team is to limit the review of this incident to the following Terms of Reference:

1. Response, notifications and communications.
2. Incident management.
3. Water supplies.
4. Utilisation of resources.
5. Provide any other information that may be of benefit for operational practices and safety in the future.

The review team should refer to the Operational Instruction, "P2 Operations Reviews" for further guidance.

Investigation Report

The Review Team Leader is to provide the report to the National Commander (sponsor) who will be responsible for developing a corrective action plan to address the conclusions of the report.

Mike Hall
National Commander

Note:

The New Zealand Fire Service Operational Instruction, P2 Operations Review, describes an Operations Review as the process by which the National Commander, Fire Region Managers, and Chief Fire Officers can analyse a particular incident to identify ways of improving safety, effectiveness and efficiency and are to be carried out when directed by the sponsor, which may be the National Commander, Fire Region Manager, or Chief Fire Officer.

It is expected that Regions and Districts will take an active approach to learning and look for opportunities for Operations Review rather than wait for an event trigger to occur.

Operations Reviews provide an objective, documented analysis of an incident/event or an aspect of an incident/event in order to:

- improve operational effectiveness and efficiency in an end-to-end service delivery
- improve operational procedures, particularly in regard to safety and best practice
- achieve compliance with the *Fire Service Act 1975*
- provide a measure of operational performance
- identify training needs
- provide evidence of hazard management as part of the NZFS Health and Safety policies as described in the *NZFS Health and Safety Manual*.

Description of Incident

At 21:18 hours on Sunday 20 September 2009, a call was received to a house fire at 47 Victoria Street, Rangiora. The call taker established that there were two elderly people in the house endeavouring to extinguish a fire with buckets of water. A smoke alarm was also sounding. An elderly male was rescued by a member of the public before the arrival of the Rangiora Brigade, but there were delays in locating and rescuing the female occupant.

Gathering of Evidence

The Review Team met in Christchurch on 30 September to commence the review and travelled to Rangiora to view the house at Victoria Street. While there, they took the opportunity to meet with daughters of the deceased and asked if they wanted to make any comment on the Fire Service operations on the night of the fire.

The daughters said they understood that there had been some difficulty in locating their mother but also appreciated that misinformation and the fire conditions did not help with the search.

The Fire Region Manager and Area Manager (North Canterbury) and the Transalpine Region Training Manager were also interviewed.

Both the Rangiora and Woodend crews who attended the incident were interviewed and given the opportunity to identify any other areas of concern that may not have been covered during the interviews.

The investigating Fire Safety Officer provided the Review Team with copies of information obtained from members of the public who rescued the male occupant, members of the Rangiora Brigade who took initial command of the incident and the BA and fire attack crews. This and additional information has been used by the Review Team to provide an objective analysis of the event.

The Investigation Team were aware of the exchanges between Fire Service and ambulance staff at the incident and discussed this with the St John Ambulance operations Manager who briefed the team on the contents of a report received from two of his staff.

CFO Mike Neason, (Cust Volunteer Brigade), had been tasked with carrying out a “debrief” of the attending Brigades in accordance with section 6 of the Command & Control Technical Manual, this was conducted on Monday the 21 September. The Review Team met with him and were provided with information from that meeting and from the Rangiora Brigade officer group meeting held on 28th September.

Operational Instructions

The following Operational Instructions were reviewed and considered during the Operations Review for application at the incident, currency and completeness.

G3 Deaths at Incidents

OS5 TRP Operational skills maintenance

OS5 TPR Operational skills maintenance

OS5 5A Schedule of OSM core skills and frequencies

E3-2 Breathing apparatus

- Recruit – Volunteer RCV-6 BA Pre-course study guide

M1 POP Command & control policy

M1SOP Command & control procedure

Command and Control

Command and control was established on the arrival of the first appliance, with the S.O assuming the role of Incident Controller. The SSO from the second arriving appliance took over command a short time later.

Initial tasking decisions relating to the search for the missing occupant were based on information provided by the male occupant and members of the public and were correct and appropriate.

As additional resources arrived, hose entanglement and unconnected charged feeders contributed to some delays in further tasking.

A decision to commence an external attack on the fire in an attempt to knock down fire in the bedroom of origin (bedroom 2) probably contributed to a worsening of conditions in the hallway of the house while the BA crew was conducting their search but also helped maintain a safe passage for those moving through the conservatory into the lounge. At 21:42 the Area Manager/Commander North Canterbury, assumed the role of Incident Controller, with the SSO taking on the role of Operations Manager. A safety officer was also appointed.

The Area Commander requested a CFO from a neighbouring volunteer brigade with relevant experience to conduct a debriefing session of all the attending brigades on the night following the incident. We have been provided with a copy of the notes from this meeting, and while brief, they capture the views expressed and agreed outcomes. These have been discussed with the CFO who agrees that they accurately represent what was said at the time

Water Supplies

There were no issues relating to adequacy of reticulated water supplies.

Notification

All relevant notifications were carried out and confirmed.

Health and Safety

There were no health and safety issues or additional hazards identified relative to this incident.

Chronology

The times that certain events occurred are accurate as recorded in the NZFS message log (SMS Report). Other events are as recalled by individuals or by using the chronology to assess when events occurred between these times.

Note: the recording of times in the SMS report are a record of when messages are received, not when an action is carried out.

Key times (to nearest minute)

Time	Event/comment	Lapsed time	BA Search (Lapsed) Time
21:17	Incident started	0	
21:18	Rangiora station alerted	1	
21:23	First Rangiora appliance arrives	5	
21:23 – 21:26 Note:	The first BA crew would have been tasked and commenced their search within 2 – 3 minutes of this time	7- 8	0
21:23	Second Rangiora appliance arrives	5	
21:28:	Priority message; 1 house totally involved, 6 BA and multiple deliveries in use	11	5 -8
21:38	Informative message; one person still unaccounted for	21	15 -18
21:42	Informative message; searching for patient, multiple deliveries in use	25	19 -22
21:42	Command responsibility changes	25	
21:50	Telephone call to Comcen confirming apparent death, based on information given by the initial BA search team on exiting the building	33	27 - 30
Note:	The first BA crews' BA warning whistles would be sounding at this time and they would be making their way out of the building. The door to the first bedroom was located at about this time and the occupant discovered	33 (estimated)	27-30
21:50 – 21: 54	During this time the , the woman was removed from the house and handed to ambulance staff	33 – 37 (estimated)	35 -38

21:54	Fire Region Manager in attendance, observed CPR being performed in the ambulance	37	
22:08	Ambulance reported departed the scene	51	45
22:15	Situation report; 1 patient in care of ambulance. Status 1 (serious)	58	
22:19	Informative message: elderly female being transported to hospital	62	

Note:

There is no record of the BA cylinder contents of the first search team, however, it is generally accepted that with a fully charged 200 bar cylinder, the maximum working duration is calculated at 35 minutes (dependant upon exertion and fitness levels of the wearers), with a ten minute safety margin included to allow safe withdrawal from the time of the warning whistle sounding. These times are estimates as the actual times would be based on cylinder contents at the start of the search and air usage rates of the wearers.

Findings

Following interviews with members of the Rangiora and Woodend Volunteer Fire Brigades, the St John Ambulance District Operations Manager, discussion with family members, (including the elderly male occupant) and review of information provided to the attending Fire Safety Officer, the Review Team are of the opinion that the following happened;

- There was no delay between receipt of the call and arrival of the Rangiora appliances
- The Communication Centre staff acted appropriately and advised the female occupant (caller) to get out of the house. It is noted from the Communication Centre transcripts that the occupants were attempting to extinguish the fire.

First arriving crew: Rangiora volunteer brigade, arrival time 21:23:13 hours

- The first appliance was aware of possible “persons reported” and, on arrival transmitted a “K99” (property fire well involved). Information was given by a member of the public who had rescued the elderly male, that a female was still in the lounge
- At some time in its past, the house had had a conservatory built on and this now contained the front (sliding) door. On arrival of the first Rangiora appliance, the fire had vented from the bedroom (bedroom 2) into the conservatory area, this was the shortest route into the lounge, where the missing woman was reported. To protect the initial search team, this area needed to be kept free from fire development.
- The OIC (Incident Controller/OIC Fire) of the first appliance tasked the first BA crew to commence search and rescue in the lounge area
- The BA crew entered the lounge via the conservatory, (main entrance into the house) with a thermal imaging camera (TIC) and a 45mm delivery
- The TIC was abandoned during the search as the smoke was too thick to see the screen. The lounge and kitchen area were searched before the search extended into the hallway, covering the rooms to the left (laundry, toilet, bathroom) and the bedroom at the end of the hallway on left. The delivery was left in the lounge while the search continued. The door to the first bedroom (bedroom 1) was not located during this search and bedroom 2, the room of origin was not able to be entered due to the fire

- Conditions in the hallway at this time were reported as thick smoke down to floor level, extreme temperatures with fire coming from the (bedroom) of origin. It is probable that these conditions were worsened by short bursts from an external delivery directed into the room of origin in an attempt to knock down flame impingement into the conservatory and maintain a safe entry/exit way into the lounge
- The BA team conducted a second search of the lounge and kitchen and the hallway. It is noted that the BA crew again failed to locate the door to the bedroom which was on the right off the hall. At this time BA whistles were sounding (low air signal) and the team started to withdraw, with one member completing the searching of the garage and the other returning down the hallway. At this time visibility was improving and the door to bedroom 1 was located
- On entering the bedroom, the missing female occupant was located on the floor and the BA team member found no sign of life and believed the woman was deceased. At this time, the need for scene preservation factored in the decision to leave her in the bedroom. In line with BA training regarding low air supply this team member then followed his partner, exited the building and reported locating the missing person.

Second arriving crew: Rangiora volunteer brigade arrival time 21:23:54 hours

- A second BA crew were instructed to report to Incident Controller
- This crew were tasked to commence fire attack with the high pressure delivery in the conservatory and work into the bedroom (bedroom 2) where the main fire was
- The fire was knocked down and the room searched by the BA crew
- While changing to a low pressure delivery, hose became tangled in one member's BA set requiring him to exit and untangle himself. At about this time the warning whistles were sounding, so the team withdrew
- Remaining crew members of this appliance were setting up a feeder line to the first appliance and running a low pressure delivery. Problems were experienced with the running of both delivery and feeder hose lines. This had no impact on the initial search
- The OIC of the second appliance, an SSO, assumed command and took over as Incident Controller

Third arriving crew: Rangiora volunteer brigade, arrival time 21:38:30 hours

- The third vehicle, a van with operational and support staff were tasked to set up scene lighting and provide a third BA crew
- This crew was tasked with another search of the lounge kitchen area then re-tasked with carrying out internal firefighting and ventilation
- The OIC of this vehicle was tasked to supervise the BA crews inside the building
- He established contact with the initial search crew (from first arriving appliance) in the hallway as the search of the garage was started. He confirms that the BA warning whistles were sounding at this time
- He confirmed with the second BA crew that the bedroom that had been on fire had been searched and no one located. He then exited the building
- On being advised that a person had been located and as the smoke was clearing, he re-entered the building and went into the bedroom where he believed he felt a pulse, at this point a crew from Woodend was already tasked to carry out the rescue and were entering the bedroom

Fourth arriving crew; Woodend volunteer brigade, arrival time 21:38:44

- A BA crew from this appliance was directed to the Operations Manager who tasked them with the rescue of the female occupant from bedroom 1
- On entering the bedroom, and attempting to remove her, they were hampered by her body being completely flaccid, her weight, and slippery nightgown
- They dragged and pushed her from the bedroom through three doorways into the lounge where a member of the Rangiora Brigade entered and managed to lift and drag her outside and hand her over to ambulance staff.

Other matters:

The time taken to complete the rescue of the female occupant has been subject to public interest and the Review Team has endeavoured to identify timing of actions relative to the search and rescue.

Using the SMS Incident Report message log, message times provided by St John Ambulance and information from the interviews conducted, it is our view that the maximum time, from the time of call to when the patient was handed over to ambulance staff was 51 minutes, or a time from the commencement of the BA search of 45 minutes. We acknowledge that these times are of limited accuracy and that actual times may be up to 10 minutes less, however, messages from the incident ground are only able to be used to confirm the time a message was sent, not the time an event occurred.

The Review Team were made aware of allegations that two senior officers had been drinking prior to the incident. This matter is the subject of a separate investigation. The review team did not find any evidence that the management of this incident was anything but competent.

Ambulance:

1. Ambulances were in attendance within a short time of being notified as they were already in the vicinity. Ambulance staff had some difficulty in identifying their staging area and became agitated over the time taken to complete the rescue of the female occupant. This resulted in some heated discussion at the scene between Fire Service and Ambulance staff. These matters were subsequently reported by ambulance staff to the St John Ambulance District Operations Manager.
2. It may not have been clear who was the Incident Controller, due to the large number of people in the area although the IC jerkin had been donned by the senior officer of the second responding appliance at an early point, (at about 21:28), and he had taken responsibility for overall direction of the incident. The Review Team met with the St John Ambulance Operations Manager to discuss the issues that had been evident at the incident. It was clear that there were differing viewpoints between St John and Fire Service members, but the key matters raised were already being considered as part of the review.
3. The review team recommended that a meeting between the Fire Service and St John be held at the earliest opportunity to address these matters. This has been held and all parties were present and given the opportunity to discuss what had happened

Visiting Firefighter:

1. During the course of our review, we were made aware of the operational status of a Fire Service employee, the Region Training Manager as a "visiting firefighter" in the Rangiora Brigade. The use of an informal position in a brigade carries risks relating to role (and rank), training records, personal records and status in the event of injury. This type of position should be formalised to ensure continuity of records and training.

Training:

1. We reviewed OSM records and questioned both Rangiora and Woodend brigade members on the extent of BA training that they had received at recruit training and for the BA revalidation component of OSM. It is our view that BA training has been provided in accordance with current procedures
2. A number of brigade members identified that, in hindsight, there was a potential for conflict between Fire Service instructions about preserving "crime scenes" and removing victims.

Conclusions

In general the Review team believes those who responded to the fire were a well resourced, well trained group of volunteers who performed within their span of experience under difficult circumstances. The review did find some issues that are worthy of further attention, either through public education or through changes to training and practice of the Fire Service.

1. The point of origin of the fire was the electric blanket and attempts by the occupants to extinguish the fire as well as leaving the bedroom door open contributed to the spread of fire
2. Had the door from the room of origin (bedroom 2) been closed by the occupants the fire would not have spread so quickly and the occupants would have had a greater chance to escape
3. It is likely both occupants would have survived if they had exited the house in the initial stages of the fire rather than staying in the house until smoke levels were below knee height and the electrical fuses had short circuited
4. The local practice of using the second pump to relay water to the first arriving pump in reticulated areas is unnecessary and should be discontinued. This practice is time wasting and commits resources (two pumps) when only one is required. It may also deplete pumping capability when a pumping appliance is required to supply water to a different sector.
5. The crew involved in the initial search had carried out a thorough search of the area that they were told the missing woman was in. The use of a thermal imaging camera to aid the search was appropriate and expected. Its limited benefit due to the low level and density of the smoke is a factor that can be expected under some fire conditions. The search pattern of the lounge and hallway was in accordance with established practice. Missing the doorway to bedroom 1 is understandable, given the density and low smoke level and the lack of touch feeling through structural gloves to identify the difference between a wall lining and a door panel. On working their way out of the house as conditions were improving, the door to bedroom 1 was located, the missing woman found and after assessing her condition, she was left in place and the find reported.
6. The BA crew tasked with rescuing the female occupant had difficulty in performing the rescue. The occupant's flaccid body, size and type of night wear all contributed to difficulties in physically picking her up and removing her from the bedroom.
7. A combination of Operational Instruction G3 Deaths at Incidents and training, may have contributed to the decision of "scene preservation" above the priority to remove a person found in a fire as soon as possible unless death can be confirmed beyond doubt.

8. The time spent in searching for the missing occupant and subsequent recovery can only be estimated. Using recorded message times it is estimated as being between 27 minutes and a maximum of 30 minutes (from the time of arrival).
9. The Rangiora Brigade, a variant 1 brigade had completed the Operational Skills Maintenance (OSM) scenarios at the Region Training centre and were either in OSM “green” or within the initial validation period. Breathing apparatus revalidation, including Search and Rescue, was confirmed by discussion with both Rangiora and Woodend Brigade members. The Region Training Manager was classed as a ‘visiting volunteer’ fire fighter in the Rangiora brigade. If he is to continue to respond as a volunteer he needs to be registered within the training system to ensure skills are current and recorded within OSM and become a full member of the brigade.
10. The matters identified by Ambulance staff were raised and discussed by the affected parties at a meeting called for that purpose. The Review Team believes that the issues identified have been addressed through the findings and corrective actions of this report.
11. Fire Service training should reinforce the instruction that the rescue of people should take the highest priority where there may be a conflict of tasks.
12. The “Safe Person Concept” taught as part of firefighter training encourages individuals to assess the situation they are in and make decisions based on the circumstances prevailing, overall objectives, tasks they are assigned, others they are working with and to accept a level of risk to themselves based on what is being protected. The application of the Safe Person concept in a dynamic situation such as this is an acceptable approach. Given the conclusions of this report, it is appropriate that the Safe Person concept be reviewed to ensure that resource material and training is aligned with Fire Service expectation.

Corrective Action Plan

Item	Action	Priority	By Whom and When
1	Review Operational Instructions and Procedures to ensure there is no conflict between rescue procedures and preservation of crime scenes procedures .	A	Director Operations and Training
2	Review local procedures for feeding reticulated water supplies through second attending pump to first arriving pump.	A	Fire Region Manager, Transalpine
4	Review the use of status of “visiting firefighter”.	B	Fire Region Manager, Transalpine
5	Brigade Training: to refresh training in “get to work” arrival procedures, such as from the mounted position, don and start BA, run feeder into pump,	A	CFO Rangiora/Woodend

	run deliveries, (flaked and coil) including basic hose drills and snap search and rescue techniques. The objective is to practice skills relating to delivery and feeder running and integration of tasks between crews.		
6	Review national training material to ensure that rescue skills and lifting techniques are included and that there is emphasis on removing victims to a safe place as first priority.	A	Director Operations and Training
7.	Review the Safe Person Concept, training material and expected outcomes	A	Director Operations and Training

Summary: *Recommendations within this report are prioritised as follows:*

Priority A: Must do with urgency to comply with Operational Instructions or safety of personnel. May have a National impact.

Priority B: Must do to improve effectiveness but may relate to implementation of other programs and/or funding. May have a Regional impact and may have a National relationship.

Priority C: Must do but generally relate to local practices, programs or procedures, rather than Regional or National practices.

Report Approvals

Investigation and report completed by:

Name: **Owen Kinsella and Brian Davey**

National Manager Operational Standards

Date:

This copy has been reviewed and approved


by:.....

Rank:.....

Date:

and complies with the New Zealand Fire Service Official Information Policy (POLCM.2.)

Appendix 1: (Not to scale)



VICTORIA STREET

Appendix 2

SMS Incident Report

19/10/2009 11:11:44 a.m.

Summary

CAD Number F0512564 **Status** Closed
Station Rangiora Volunteer Fire Brigade
Incident Started 20/09/2009 9:17:42 p.m. **Incident Ended** 20/09/2009 11:49:17 p.m.
Incident Type 1101: Structure fire with damage
Common Name
Address 47 VICTORIA STREET RANGIORA
Alarm Method 111 Telephone **Alarm Level** 2
PFA Number
Zone 357601 **Risk Classification** N
Map Grid E 1567220 **Map Grid N** 5205021
First Caller TELSTRACLEAR LTD **First Caller Contact** 33134277
(WHOLESALE RESI
Incident Closed 30/09/2009 11:12:49 a.m.
Report Completed 20:56, Mon 12 Oct 2009 by Kerry Ealam

Responses

Callsign	Type	Station Alert	Enroute Time	Arrival Time	Departed
RANG761	P1	21:18:16	21:21:49	21:23:13	00:15:10
		20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	21 Sep 2009
		21:18:16	21:23:20	21:23:54	00:12:55
RANG767	PR	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	21 Sep 2009
		21:24:16	21:25:59	21:29:06	00:22:30
19A	OF	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	21 Sep 2009
		21:25:10	21:25:11	21:38:30	00:12:09
RANG7629	VN	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	21 Sep 2009
		21:29:07	21:32:11	21:38:44	23:05:52
WOOD777	PR	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009
		21:51:15	21:51:16	21:54:15	23:02:31
TRANSALP1	OF	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009
		21:42:52	21:47:02	21:55:25	23:40:40
KAIA401	P1	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009
		21:54:33	21:59:54	22:29:17	14:12:15
CHRIFSO9	FSO				

		20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	21 Sep 2009
		22:33:11	22:33:37	22:58:20	23:12:45
CHRI2114	CU				
		20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009	20 Sep 2009
	Start->Alert				
		7 min	10 min		
0 min			15 min		30 min
	Alert->1st Arrival				

Elapsed Times

Callsign	Start To Alert	Alert To Arrival	Start To Arrival	Start To Depart
RANG761	00:00:34	00:04:57	00:05:31	02:57:28
RANG767	00:00:34	00:05:38	00:06:12	02:55:13
19A	00:06:34	00:04:50	00:11:24	03:04:48
RANG7629	00:07:28	00:13:20	00:20:48	02:54:27
WOOD777	00:11:25	00:09:37	00:21:02	01:48:10
TRANSALP1	00:33:33	00:03:00	00:36:33	01:44:49
KAIA401	00:25:10	00:12:33	00:37:43	02:22:58
CHRIFSO9	00:36:51	00:34:44	01:11:35	16:54:33
CHRI2114	01:15:29	00:25:09	01:40:38	01:55:03

Notifications

Date	Time	Party Notified
20 Sep 2009	21:19:29	PAGED CFO/DCFO RANGIORA RE PERSOSN REPORTED
20 Sep 2009	21:20:34	PAGED CFO/DCFO RANGIORA RE PERSOSN REPORTED
20 Sep 2009	21:24:40	MAINPOWER
20 Sep 2009	21:25:23	AM19A ACK PAGE ADVISES HE IS RESPONDING 3
20 Sep 2009	21:25:41	PAGED FRC TRANSALPINE/AM 21A (ON CALL)
20 Sep 2009	21:27:17	FRC BARCLAY ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	21:29:30	FRC SAUNDERS ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	21:45:02	PAGED FRC/AM TRANSALPINE, CFO/DCFO RANGIORA RE 2ND ALARM
20 Sep 2009	21:53:08	PAGED NATIONAL COMMANDERS GROUP/MAORI ADVISOR K41-1
20 Sep 2009	21:53:29	PAGED FRC/AM TRANSALPINE, CFO/DCFO RANGIORA K41-1
20 Sep 2009	21:54:02	FSO CHRISTCHURCH MARK THOMAS K41-1
20 Sep 2009	21:54:30	FSO CHCH THOMAS ACK PAGE RESPONDING
20 Sep 2009	21:55:59	NATIONAL MAORI ADVISOR PIKI THOMAS ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	21:59:39	DIRECTOR STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT BILL BUTZBACH ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	22:04:22	TRANSALPINE IWI LIAISON OFFICER PAKI JOHNSTON ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	22:05:10	PAGED OPS MGR MUNRO
20 Sep 2009	22:07:46	OPS MUNRO ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	22:17:55	FSO JOHNSTONE IS NOW TRAVELLING WITH FSO THOMAS TO RANGIORA
20 Sep 2009	22:20:40	SSO CITY STATION RE BA REQUEST SSO MELTON ORGANISING 20 CYLINDERS
20 Sep 2009	23:15:41	WOODEND BRIGADE OFFERED CISM DECLINED AT THIS STAGE
20 Sep 2009	23:18:50	AM19A ACK PAGE ADVISES HE IS RESPONDING 3
20 Sep 2009	23:18:50	FRC BARCLAY ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	23:18:50	PAGED FRC TRANSALPINE/AM 21A (ON CALL)
20 Sep 2009	23:18:50	MAINPOWER
20 Sep 2009	23:18:50	FRC SAUNDERS ACK PAGE
20 Sep 2009	23:18:51	PAGED NATIONAL COMMANDERS GROUP/MAORI ADVISOR K41-1
20 Sep 2009	23:18:51	PAGED FRC/AM TRANSALPINE, CFO/DCFO RANGIORA RE 2ND ALARM
20 Sep 2009	23:18:51	PAGED FRC/AM TRANSALPINE, CFO/DCFO RANGIORA K41-1

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20 Sep 2009 23:18:51 FSO CHRISTCHURCH MARK THOMAS K41-1
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:52 FSO CHCH THOMAS ACK PAGE RESPONDING
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:52 DIRECTOR STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT BILL BUTZBACH ACK PAGE
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:52 NATIONAL MAORI ADVISOR PIKI THOMAS ACK PAGE
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:52 PAGED OPS MGR MUNRO
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:52 TRANSALPINE IWI LIAISON OFFICER PAKI JOHNSTON ACK PAGE
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:53 FSO JOHNSTONE IS NOW TRAVELLING WITH FSO THOMAS TO RANGIORA
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:53 OPS MUNRO ACK PAGE
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:53 SSO CITY STATION RE BA REQUEST SSO MELTON ORGANISING 20
 CYLINDERS
 20 Sep 2009 23:18:54 WOODEND BRIGADE OFFERED CISM DECLINED AT THIS STAGE
 20 Sep 2009 23:19:08 AM NORTH CANTERBURY REQUESTS UPDATE OF PATIENTS STATUS
 20 Sep 2009 23:22:25 PAGED FSO CHCH MARK THOMAS
 20 Sep 2009 23:22:55 FSO THOMAS/JOHNSTONE ACK PAGE - JUST ARRIVED AT THE HOSPITAL
 WILL ADVISE
 20 Sep 2009 23:24:09 PAGED AM 19A WITH ABOVE MESSAGE RE FIRE SAFETY
 20 Sep 2009 23:36:43 FSO CHCH THOMAS/JOHNSTONE RANG IN WITH STATUS OF PATIENTS
 20 Sep 2009 23:36:58 PAGED AM 19A (ROSS DITMER) RE STATUS OF PATIENTS
 20 Sep 2009 23:44:15 AM 19A RANG IN - HE IS ALREADY TALKING WITH RANGIORA RE CISM AND
 WILL GET
 20 Sep 2009 23:45:09 PAGED AM 19A RE STATUS OF SCENE GUARD
 20 Sep 2009 23:49:07 KAIAPOI BRIGADE OFFERED CISM DECLINED AT THIS STAGE
 21 Sep 2009 00:37:34 ORION
 21 Sep 2009 00:38:53 DISREGARD ORION
 21:18:03 INC INFO: FIRE
 21:18:03 INC INFO: HOUSE FIRE
 21:18:04 ** LOI search completed at 20/09/09 21:18:04
 21:18:10 ** Recommended unit RANG761 for requirement PUMP (>0.37 km)
 21:18:10 ** Recommended unit RANG767 for requirement PUMP (>0.37 km)
 21:18:20 PERSONS REPORTED
 21:19:19 *
 21:19:25 XXXX POLICE AND AMBORESPOND TO A PERSONS REPORTED HOUSE FIRE XXXX
 21:19:30 *
 21:20:06 AMBO EVENT 0622-3-2009/09/20-FIR LINKED AT 20/09/2009 21:20:06
 21:20:34 PERSONS REPORTED
 21:20:34 Problem changed to: 07CF BLDG FIRE/PERSNS RPTD
 21:20:34 INC INFO: FIRE
 21:20:34 INC INFO: HOUSE FIRE
 21:20:34 Location = 47 VICTORIA ST,RANGIORA,WAIMAKARIRI DISTRICT
 21:20:34 XXXX POLICE AND AMBORESPOND TO A PERSONS REPORTED HOUSE FIRE XXXX
 21:20:34 *
 21:20:34 AMBO update to 0622-3-2009/09/20-FIR:
 21:20:34 Caller Name = TELSTRACLEAR LTD (WHOLESALE RE, Caller Address = 47 VICTORIA
 21:20:34 STREET, RANGIORA,WAIMAKARIRI DISTRICT, Caller Phone = 33134277, Headline = HOUSE
 21:20:34 FIRE
 21:20:48 ELDERLY CALLERS TRYING TO GET BUCKETS OF WATER TO FIGHT FIRE.
 21:21:14 Location = 47 VICTORIA ST,RANGIORA,WAIMAKARIRI DISTRICT
 21:21:14 For Fire: Ambulance Responding
 21:21:14 AMBO update to 0622-3-2009/09/20-FIR:
 21:21:14 ELDERLY CALLERS TRYING TO GET BUCKETS OF WATER TO FIGHT FIRE.
 21:21:14 Caller Name = TELSTRACLEAR LTD (WHOLESALE RE, Caller Address = 47 VICTORIA
 21:21:14 STREET, RANGIORA,WAIMAKARIRI DISTRICT, Caller Phone = 33134277, Headline = HOUSE
 21:21:14 FIRE
 21:21:50 Unit RANG761 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]

21:22:27 Unit RANG761 [COMCEN COM : MESSAGE] PERSONS REPORTED ELDERLY COUPLE TAKING
 21:22:27 BUCKETS OF WATER TO FIGHT THE FIRE
 21:23:13 Unit RANG761 [K99 : PROPERTY FIRE WELL INV]
 21:23:20 Unit RANG767 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 21:23:24 Unit RANG761 [KP : PRIORITY MESSAGE]
 21:23:37 Unit RANG761 [K11P : POLICE REQUIRED]
 21:23:44 Unit RANG761 [K11E : ELECTRICAL AUTHORITY REQUIRED]
 21:23:51 FOR AMBO: ELDERLY PATIENTS SHORT OF BREATH. POSS R
 21:23:54 Unit RANG767 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 21:24:35 *
 21:24:45 *
 21:24:47]
 21:25:12 Unit RANG7629 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 21:25:18 *
 21:25:42 *
 21:26:00 Unit 19A [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 21:27:49 Unit RANG761 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 21:27:55 Unit RANG761 [KP : PRIORITY MESSAGE]
 21:28:10 Unit RANG761 [KP : PRIORITY MESSAGE] MP 3
 21:28:13 Unit RANG761 [KP : PRIORITY MESSAGE]
 21:28:41 Unit RANG761 [KP : PRIORITY MESSAGE] SSO EALAM 1 HOUSE TOTALLY INV WW 6BA MULT
 21:28:41 DEL
 21:28:58 ** Recommended unit WOOD777 for requirement PUMP (>5.82 km)
 21:29:06 Unit 19A [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 21:29:15 *
 21:29:32 *
 21:30:30 ** Event Type changed from FIR2POL to 1F(2) at: 20/09/09 21:30:30
 21:32:12 Unit WOOD777 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 21:38:18 ONE PERSON ACCOUNTED FOR..
 21:38:28 ONE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR..
 21:38:30 .
 21:38:30 Unit RANG7629 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 21:38:34 ONC NCO TO BE ADVISED
 21:38:44 Unit WOOD777 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 21:41:33 Unit RANG761 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 21:42:05 Unit RANG761 [SITREP :] AM DITMER SEARCHING FOR PATIENT MULTIPLE DELS IN USE
 21:42:10 Unit RANG761 [KP : PRIORITY MESSAGE]
 21:42:20 Unit RANG761 [K45 : COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY CHANGED TO - NAME] AM DITMER
 21:42:25 ONC PAGED X2
 21:42:37 Unit RANG761 [KP : PRIORITY MESSAGE] MP 4 BA WEARERS
 21:42:46 ** Recommended unit KAIA401 for requirement PUMP (>9.54 km)
 21:42:46 ** Alarm level updated to 2
 21:44:48 *
 21:45:04 *
 21:47:02 Unit KAIA401 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 21:50:09 41 -1 19A CONFIRMS DEATH. HAS SPOKEN TO FRC SAUNDERS. WILL CONFIRM OVER THE
 21:50:09 RADIO
 21:51:16 Unit TRANSALP1 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 21:51:36 NCO BARNETT 10/2
 21:52:24 *
 21:53:10 *
 21:53:30 *
 21:54:03 *
 21:54:15 Unit TRANSALP1 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]

21:54:32 *
 21:55:25 Unit KAIA401 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 21:56:01 *
 21:58:53 VICTIM SUPPORT PAGED
 21:59:40 *
 21:59:54 Unit CHRIFSO9 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 22:01:49 VICTIM SUPPOERT 10/2
 22:03:50 *
 22:04:24 *
 22:05:12 *
 22:05:48 FSO JOY JOHNSTONE WILL RESPOND WITH FSO THOMAS IN HIS VEHICLE
 22:05:50 *
 22:07:47 *
 22:14:11 Unit RANG761 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 22:15:12 Unit RANG761 [SITREP :] REMOVED 1 PATIENT IN CARE OF AMBULANCE 1 OTHER STATUS
 22:15:12 ONE ENROUTE TO HOSP MULT BA MULT HR IN USE
 22:16:09 Unit RANG761 [COMCEN COM : MESSAGE] CONFIRM NO K41-1 (CONFIRM NO K41 - STATUS 1
 22:16:09 AT THIS STAGE)
 22:17:54 Unit RANG761 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 22:18:15 Unit RANG761 [SITREP :] SO REGAN 20 BA CYLINDERS TO INCIDENT
 22:19:44 ELDERLY FEMALE CHASTON/JEAN BEING TRANSPORTED TO HOSPITAL
 22:19:48 WAS GIVEN CPR
 22:19:56 PULSE RESPONDED
 22:19:59 .
 22:20:09 *
 22:20:16 CHASTON/JACK AGED 89YRS SUPERFICIAL BURNS
 22:20:24 TRANSPORTED TO HOSPITAL
 22:20:25 .
 22:20:42 *
 22:21:10 SSO MELTON WILL PHONE BACK WITH WHICH UNIT WILL DELIVER BA SETS
 22:21:12 *
 22:23:19 SON IS CHASTON/JONATHON 7 CALVERTON PL HALSWELL CHRISTCHURCH 3224350
 22:23:25 ANSWERPHONE ONLY
 22:23:31 NO MESSAGE LEFT
 22:23:32 .
 22:23:51 COULD WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONTACT AND ADVISE TO HEAD TO HOSPITAL
 22:27:52 Unit RANG7629 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 22:29:17 Unit CHRIFSO9 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 22:29:24 *
 22:30:13 SSO MELTON ADVISED ONLY 15 CYLINDERS AVAILABLE THEY WILL BE DELIVERED IN THE
 22:30:13 COMMAND UNIT ONCE IT IS LOADED UP
 22:30:15 *
 22:33:37 Unit CHRI2114 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
 22:37:55 Unit WOOD777 [K22-1 : UNIT AVAILABLE FOR A FURTHER EVENT]
 22:49:39 SCENE GUARD TO BE ORGANISED
 22:52:53 Unit CHRIFSO9 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 22:53:58 Unit CHRIFSO9 [SITREP :] CHCHFSO9 AND FSO1 ARE RETURNING TO TOWN TO HOSP TO
 22:53:58 TALK TO 1 OF THE PARTIES AND WE WILL BE RETURNING TO THE SCENE IN THE MORNING
 22:56:06 Unit CHRI2114 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 22:56:57 Unit CHRI2114 [SITREP :] DIRECTIONS (PASSED)
 22:58:20 Unit CHRI2114 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
 22:59:16 Unit RANG761 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 22:59:57 Unit RANG761 [SITREP :] AM19 BRIGADE NOW DAMPENING DOWN AND GOING TO SCALE
 22:59:57 DOWN AND RELEASE KAIAPOI AND WOODEND SHORTLY

23:02:31 Unit TRANSALP1 [K4 : ON RT INSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
 23:05:52 Unit WOOD777 [K3 : ON RT OUTSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
 23:08:34 Unit KAIA401 [K22-1 : UNIT AVAILABLE FOR A FURTHER EVENT]
 23:12:45 Unit CHRI2114 [K4 : ON RT INSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
 23:13:41 *
 23:15:42 *
 23:18:50 FOR AMBO: ELDERLY PATIENTS SHORT OF BREATH. POSS R
 23:18:50 *
 23:18:50]
 23:18:51 *
 23:18:51 .
 23:18:51 RADIO
 23:18:51 ONE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR..
 23:18:51 ONE PERSON ACCOUNTED FOR..
 23:18:51 ONC PAGED X2
 23:18:51 ONC NCO TO BE ADVISED
 23:18:51 41 -1 19A CONFIRMS DEATH. HAS SPOKEN TO FRC SAUNDERS. WILL CONFIRM OVER THE
 23:18:51 NCO BARNETT 10/2
 23:18:52 VICTIM SUPPOERT 10/2
 23:18:52 FSO JOY JOHNSTONE WILL RESPOND WITH FSO THOMAS IN HIS VEHICLE
 23:18:52 VICTIM SUPPORT PAGED
 23:18:52 *
 23:18:53 NO MESSAGE LEFT
 23:18:53 PULSE RESPONDED
 23:18:53 SON IS CHASTON/JONATHON 7 CALVERTON PL HALSWELL CHRISTCHURCH 3224350
 23:18:53 SSO MELTON WILL PHONE BACK WITH WHICH UNIT WILL DELIVER BA SETS
 23:18:53 TRANSPORTED TO HOSPITAL
 23:18:53 WAS GIVEN CPR
 23:18:53 ANSWERPHONE ONLY
 23:18:53 CHASTON/JACK AGED 89YRS SUPERFICIAL BURNS
 23:18:53 COULD WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONTACT AND ADVISE TO HEAD TO HOSPITAL
 23:18:53 ELDERLY FEMALE CHASTON/JEAN BEING TRANSPORTED TO HOSPITAL
 23:18:54 ** Cancel Event:Event Canceled by InterCAD
 23:18:54 COMMAND UNIT ONCE IT IS LOADED UP
 23:18:54 Incident Closed. Reason: Complete - Medical
 23:18:54 SCENE GUARD TO BE ORGANISED
 23:18:54 SSO MELTON ADVISED ONLY 15 CYLINDERS AVAILABLE THEY WILL BE DELIVERED IN THE
 23:19:08 *
 23:22:26 *
 23:22:55 STATUS OF PATIENTS AS SOON AS THEY CAN
 23:22:56 *
 23:23:57 *
 23:24:10 *'
 23:36:44 *
 23:36:59 *
 23:40:41 Unit KAIA401 [K4 : ON RT INSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
 23:43:36 *
 23:44:15 BACK TO US - CAN YOU ASK POLICE FOR AN ETA OF THE SCENE GUARD
 23:44:16 *
 23:44:32 FROM POLICE SHE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE THERE AT 2330 - SHOULDNT BE LONG NOW
 23:44:33 *
 23:45:10 *
 23:48:59 Unit RANG767 [KC : UNIT CALLING]
 23:49:09 *

23:49:17 Unit RANG767 [K47 : STOP MESSAGE: MESSAGE UNCHANGED FROM INFORMATIVE]
23:49:18 Unit RANG767 [K22-1 : UNIT AVAILABLE FOR A FURTHER EVENT]
23:50:46 Unit CHRIFSO9 [K4 : ON RT INSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
00:12:09 Unit RANG7629 [K4 : ON RT INSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
00:12:56 Unit RANG767 [K4 : ON RT INSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
00:15:10 Unit RANG761 [K4 : ON RT INSIDE NORMAL TURNOUT AREA]
00:22:31 Unit 19A [K6 : ON TELEPAGER]
08:57:11 Unit CHRIFSO9 [K1 : PROCEEDING TO INCIDENT]
09:31:21 Unit CHRIFSO9 [K2 : IN ATTENDANCE AT INCIDENT]
14:12:16 Unit CHRIFSO9 [K6 : ON TELEPAGER]
11:12:48 ** Assigned Result Code: STRU, Detailed Event Type: 1100, Qualifier 1: Q1,
11:12:48 UNIT RANG7629 ALERT TIME [NULL] ADJUSTED TO
11:12:48 Qualifier 2:
11:12:49 UNIT TRANSALP1 ALERT TIME [NULL] ADJUSTED TO

Incident

CAD Number F0512564
Incident Reporter Kerry Ealam
Incident Controller S.S.O. KERRY EALAM
Distance Travelled (km) 1
Delay In Receiving Call Information not recorded

Property Details

Occupant MR AND MRS CHASTON
Building Owner Owner occupied
General Property Use Single house
Special Property Use Single house
Purpose Group

Actions

Persons Reported Trapped Yes
Evacuation Status No evacuation
Action Prior 1 Rescue performed to save life
Action Prior 2 Bucket/Container of water, bucket pump
Action Taken Extinguishment and ventilation

Civilians

Civilians Rescued 2
Civilians Extricated 0
Civilians Assisted 0
Civilians Evacuated

Origin

Location Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons
Level Ground level, Ground floor

Equipment Used

Quantity	Equipment
2	Hose reel, high pressure delivery
2	Low pressure delivery
12	BA set
10	Handheld Radio (or Cellphone)
1	Thermal Imaging Camera
1	Generator
2	Ladder
1	Hand tools: Crowbar, Saw, Hammer, Mop, Broom, Misc small gear

Equipment Involved

Equipment Involved Electric blanket
Year
Make
Model

Fire

Arrival Condition	Totally involved fire		
Heat Source	Short circuit arc: Unspecified		
Termination Stage	Flame		
First Object Ignited	Upholstered Furniture eg. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats		
First Object Material	Polyurethane eg. Furnishings, Upholstery, Mattresses		
Second Object Ignited	Bedding eg. Blankets, Sheets, Duvet		
Second Object Material	Cotton, Canvas, Rayon (not oiled canvas)		
Indicated Cause	Other electrical failure		
Certainty of Cause	Medium		
Age of Person	No person involved		
Ethnicity	No person involved		
Gender			
FAIP Service Offered	No	FAIP Service Accepted	No

Alarms

Type of Alarm Initiating Call	Domestic (Home) sprinkler
Performance of System Failure/Ineffectiveness of system	Detector operated, but was not a factor in discovery of fire
Number of sprinkler heads operated	

Structure

Area of One Floor	285
Age of Building	1970 - 1991
Structural Frame Type	Brick, Blocks etc
Number of Floors	1
Number of Basements	0
Internal Wall Lining	Gypsum board (e.g. Gib board, Elephant board)
Ceiling Lining	Gypsum board (e.g. Gib board, Elephant board)
Material Generating Most Flame	Vinyl, Plastic coated fabrics, Upholstery fabrics
Material Generating Most Smoke	Vinyl, Plastic coated fabrics, Upholstery fabrics
Avenue of Flame Travel	Interior window failure
Avenue of Smoke Travel	Exterior spread
Extent of Flame Damage	Confined to structure of origin
Area of Flame Damage	150
Extent of Smoke Damage	Confined to structure of origin

F0512564	10	/	11	19/10/2009 11:11:44 a.m.
SMS Incident Report				
Area of Smoke Damage	280			
Extent of Water Damage	Confined to structure of origin			
Area of Water Damage	150			
Extent of Fire Control	No damage of this type			

Damage

**Area of Fire Control
Damage** 0

Casualties**Casualty Number1**

Gender Female
Age 87
Apparent Injury Inhalation: smoke
Ethnicity NZ European/Pakeha
Severity of Injury Fatality
Bleeding No
Action by Fire Fighters Rescued person
Condition Before Injury Awake, unimpaired
How Removed Taken to hospital: Ambulance
Location at Ignition Person in room or space of fire origin
Factor Preventing Escape NOTHING preventing escape
Activity When Injured Fire control attempt
Cause of Injury Exposed to fire products
Victim Aware of Fire Victim alerted by other than domestic smoke
Room Where Victim Found Bedroom, sleeping room
Location Where Victim Found Beside, behind bed
Familiarity With Property Over 1 year

F0512564 11

/11 19/10/2009 11:11:44 a.m.

SMS Incident Report

Comments

08:56, Mon 12 October 2009

Reporter Comments

FIRE SAFETY OFFICER MARK THOMAS ATTENDED THIS CALL ALSO.

Kerry Ealam

The information contained in this report is subject to the provisions of the Official Information Act 1982 and the Privacy Act 1993. Neither the information nor the report should be released to any person outside the NZ Fire Service or the National Rural Fire Authority without prior approval.

Some message timestamps may differ to actual times in multi-agency incidents. Communication centres can supply correct times if essential.